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BORN CLASSIFIED, BORN FREE: AN ESSAY
FOR HENRY SCHWARZSCHILD
Aviam Soifer*
The Saturday after Kristallnacht in November 1938 was to be
Henry Schwarzschild's Bar Mitzvah. Henry's family went ahead
with this illegal ceremony in secret and then escaped Berlin for
the United States. I first met Henry when I spent the summer of
1979 at the national office of the ACLU. As I will explain, there
are many reasons to dedicate this Article about freedom of ex-
pression, exogenous challenges to law, and the obligation to
search for justice to Henry Schwarzschild's prophetic presence
and to his memory. Somehow the idea of peaceful rest does not
seem apt for Henry's activist soul. May his life and his unique
mix of skepticism and passionate engagement be remembered for
a blessing.
"Seekers of truth and guardians of the right increase peace in the
world. "1
PROLOGUE: To BE NOT IGNORANT OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID2
The huge headline leapt from the full-page advertisement in a
September 1991 issue of the New York Times: "This year Kristall-
nacht took place on August 19th right here in Crown Heights."3
The ad labeled that summer's violence in Williamsburg a "po-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I would like to thank a
M6bius strip of friends who shared in admiration of Henry and who were willing to read
earlier drafts of this Article. They include: Milner Ball, Marlene Booth, Danny Green-
berg, George Kannar, Carol Weisbrod, Steve Wizner, and Larry Yackle. I also benefitted
enormously from research assistance by David Kurtz and, particularly, Christine Vanston,
and from the editorial suggestions of my parents. I am most grateful to all these people
and to the editors of the Cardozo Law Review for encouraging and sticking with this Arti-
cle.
I Shalom Spiegel, Amos vs. Amaziah, in THE JEWISH EXPRESSION 38, 63 (Judah
Goldin ed., 1976) (quoting the Talmud, Berakhoth 64a).
2 At the end of 1859, Henry David Thoreau noted in his journal that "he who speaks
with most authority on a given subject is not ignorant of what has been said by his prede-
cessors." ROBERT D. RICHARDSON JR., HENRY THOREAU: A LIFE OF THE MIND 379
(1986). A few days later, Thoreau wrote: "A man receives only what he is ready to re-
ceive, whether physically or intellectually or morally.... We hear and apprehend only
what we already half know.... Every man thus tracks himself through life, in all his
hearing and reading and observation and traveling." Id. at 379-80.
3 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at A21.
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grom" and sought tax-deductible contributions to the Crown
Heights Emergency Fund to combat "neo-Nazism in its most
virulent form."4
Since New York Times v. Sullivan,' it has been clear that the
expression in this and similar advertisements is constitutionally
protected. Seldom, however, has such speech been met with words
as carefully chosen, yet as robust, wide-open, and vehement as
those contained in a letter by Henry Schwarzschild published by
the Times a few weeks later. Under the headline "Invoking
Kristallnacht Betrays Jewish History," Henry argued that "the
characterization of the events following the automobile death of a
black child in Brooklyn... as a Kristallnacht is a betrayal of Jew-
ish history and ethics."6 Henry mentioned his direct experience
with Kristallnacht "only to indicate that I have some credentials
for knowing a Kristallnacht when I see one."7
Skilled polemicist that he was, Henry went on to decry black
anti-Semitism and the demagogues who encourage it. Yet his let-
ter even more caustically criticized Jewish community leaders for
their failure to express sadness more promptly and publicly at the
death of a seven-year-old "occasioned by the Lubavitcher rebbe's
motorcade. '8 It was those who abuse history "for transient politi-
cal and financial gain"9 who constituted Henry's main target.
Henry's letter is a forceful reminder that we are all born into a
web of traditions. Life consists of an ongoing series of negotia-
tions with and about identities and traditions with which we all en-
ter the world. As I will discuss below, Henry's vivid personal
knowledge of the significance of being classified as Jewish in Ger-
many in the 1930s undoubtedly had much to do with his many
campaigns against state-sanctioned and judicially-imposed injus-
tice. Humankind has shown a distressing tendency to make a per-
son's belongings depend on her belonging. Countless beloveds
have been torn away forcefully, even lethally, from those who long
for them.'0 Paradoxically, those who bear the tragic burdens of
4 Id.
5 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6 Henry Schwarzschild, Invoking Kristallnacht Betrays Jewish History, N.Y. TIMES,




10 1 am not alluding solely to the Holocaust, unhappily, nor is the belonging/beloved
dichotomy entirely free of moral complexity. See, e.g., TONI MORRISON, BELOVED
(1987).
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history most directly may also have a special responsibility to seek
justice.
At the close of a century often gruesome and frequently
downright horrific, the powerful urge to resist all government clas-
sifications of people is hardly surprising. We know that classifica-
tions can often be used to discriminate-and sometimes to aid and
abet murder. The ahistorical ideal of a free individual, liberated
from all classificatory schemes that others seek to impose, may be
particularly appealing in an era when official abuse of human clas-
sifications has been so appalling.
Americans in particular seem to share a long-standing, wide-
spread desire to float free of history. The aristocrat Alexis de
Tocqueville commented on the phenomenon more than 150 years
ago. Tocqueville explained:
[N]ot only does democracy make men forget their ancestors,
but also clouds their view of their descendants and isolates them
from their contemporaries. Each man is forever thrown back
on himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut up in
the solitude of his own heart."
To be sure, the deracination inherent in ahistoricism can be at
least partially liberating. Yet it is a liberation that depends upon
the mirage of a free marketplace of individual pasts and futures,
purchased, in actuality, at a considerable price. Moreover, histori-
cal awareness is more apt to be crucial for the downtrodden. This
is because history subverts the very idea that the status quo is
somehow natural or inevitable. Its complexities correct for the no-
tion that whatever exists today is the best that can be.
This Article first focuses on state-sanctioned classifications in
the context of the First Amendment. Through the prism of official
classificatory schemes, we can better understand the convolutions
of the Pentagon Papers litigation. The problem of insiders and
classified information also helps to explain why the New York
Times precedent meant so little a few years later when the Gov-
ernment successfully enjoined publication of an article in The Pro-
gressive for over half a year.' 2
By discussing challenges to law mounted by members of dis-
parate interpretive communities who stand at least partially out-
side the legal system, this Article also seeks to illuminate differ-
ences between absolutes and universal principles. It suggests why
11 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 508 (J.P. Mayer ed., Dou-
bleday Books 1969) (1966).
12 See infra Part I.C.2.
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we should always be at least somewhat skeptical of the mainstream
tendencies of the judicial imprimatur-whether in determining
who gets access to information or who is condemned to die-and
keenly aware of the danger that any judicial decision may take on
a life, or a death, of its own.
In our society, absolutism and true belief frequently are con-
flated, and condemned. Yet there is an elusive but important dis-
tinction between absolute beliefs and universal principles. A skep-
tic about absolutes may be the very person most committed to the
ongoing quest for universal principles. Someone else may long for
absolutes, yet refuse to wait while confronting current injustice.
A sense of the critical importance of context concentrates on
justice now. The demanding immediacy of this approach differs
both from abstract predictions of what will make a just world, and
from inflexible principles of life, law, or experience. From a van-
tage point within. the belly of the beast-for example, from the
perspective of insiders within the federal government's classifica-
tion system-as well as from the external perspective of a
self-described professional outsider such as Henry Schwarzschild,
this is a distinction that sometimes makes a crucial difference.
Henry Schwarzschild's life suggests the difficulty inherent in
an active life of courageous integrity. His insistent moral witness
caused trouble when he punctured idolatry of all kinds. For ex-
ample, he frequently challenged all of us who make and uphold
law. Henry did so more directly and with more consistency than
most. His approach was quite different from the patterns we may
be able to discern in the story of Daniel Ellsberg and the journal-
ists who pushed with gutsiness and gusto to publish stories from
the Pentagon Papers. Throughout his life, Henry sought to tran-
scend unquestioning reverence for law along with other true belief
systems. Yet it took deep skepticism, along with a strong sense of
the tragic obligations of history, for Henry to avoid the pitfalls of
solipsism. In other words, to reflect upon the example of Henry
Schwarzschild's life is to dare to doubt-and to stretch even be-
yond the search for justice to the jagged quest for righteousness.
I. CLASSIFYING CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES
A. Refreshing Recollection
Like many a skilled lawyer before him, David Rudenstine
manages to refresh recollection while also enhancing it. His me-
ticulous study of the Pentagon Papers litigation and its context
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admirably reminds us of a dramatic time replete with jagged, im-
passioned disputation. To Rudenstine's credit, he also presents
much that went unexamined until his book. Another great
strength of The Day the Presses Stopped13 is Rudenstine's consid-
erable skill in describing and cogently criticizing tactical choices
and legal maneuvers made by the lawyers and judges on all sides
of the case.
Again and again, The Day the Presses Stopped illuminates a
central irony of legal strategy in important high-profile cases: law-
yers are compelled to classify a case quickly, but highly-charged
cases have a way of changing rapidly and repeatedly, thereby insis-
tently undercutting the legal pigeonholes into which any particular
conflict has been jammed. Rudenstine effectively takes readers
behind the scenes, and he successfully conveys the drama and flux
of such a case.
To people who have not had the benefit of The Day the
Presses Stopped, the Pentagon Papers litigation may seem a pure
judicial rejection of an unprecedented effort by the federal gov-
ernment to impose a prior restraint on newspapers. After all, that
the First Amendment protected primarily-or, at the least, fun-
damentally-against just such a prior restraint was almost a clich6
by 1971. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the battle of the
titans in this case fit into a familiar constitutional law category with
rare exactitude: national security concerns clashed with basic free-
dom of the press claims. The judge's job seemed simply to be to
apply the particular First Amendment theory he favored to declare
who the winners and losers ought to be.
Seemingly, any judge would be aided by the fact that Near v.
Minnesota,'14 the clearest precedent, provided vivid, yet wonder-
fully malleable, hypotheticals. Near boldly declared strong judicial
disapprobation of prior restraints, but Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes's opinion for a five-to-four majority also suggested signifi-
cant exceptions to the principle the case announced. Hughes sug-
gested that a court unquestionably could and should halt a publica-
tion that was about to disclose the sailing dates of transports, the
location of troops, and the like. 5 Near thus seemed to clear away
the underbrush, facilitating consideration of whether the govern-
ment's effort to halt disclosure of the Pentagon Papers was analo-
gous to the exceptions cryptically suggested in Near. In fact, Wil-
13 DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED (1996).
14 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
15 See id. at 716.
19981 1373
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
liam Rehnquist, then the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, relied pri-
marily on Near when he advised Attorney General John Mitchell
and Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian that the Court
would most likely uphold an injunction against publication. 16
Categorization of the government action as a prior restraint in
turn seemed to establish who had to meet what burden in court,
and how weighty competing presumptions might prove to be. In-
deed, the prior restraint label, in conjunction with the Govern-
ment's disastrous presentation of its case in closed session, does
much to explain how Judge Murray Gurfein, a Republican stalwart
and former prosecutor who was newly appointed to the federal
bench by President Nixon, could wind up refusing to enjoin publi-
cation by the New York Times. The label continued to stick in the
Supreme Court.
B. Absolutes v. Universals
Though Justices Black and Douglas were the only absolutists
who read the First Amendment to bar all prior restraints, Justice
Brennan came close. Because Brennan discerned the First
Amendment's primary purpose to be protection against prior re-
straints, he prescribed a legal standard that was, in effect, virtually
unattainable by the government. The prior restraint label also
pushed Justice Stewart to reject the Government's claims because
he similarly believed that the Government was obliged to prove-
and had failed to demonstrate-"direct, immediate, and irrepara-
ble damage to our Nation or its people."'7 Justice White's recogni-
tion of "the concededly extraordinary protection against prior re-
straints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system"'"
also figured decisively in his analysis. Though Justice Marshall re-
lied primarily on a separation of powers theory in voting against
the Government, he also vigorously chided the Nixon Administra-
tion for attempting to dodge the normal pattern of congressional
legislation and a subsequent criminal trial through its efforts to
convince a lone judge to impose a prior restraint. 19
Justice Black's passionate assertions about the, absolute pro-
16 See RUDENSTINE, supra note 13, at 79-80.
17 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring).
18 Id. at 730-31 (White, J., concurring). The three dissenters did not disagree that the
case involved a prior restraint and that, accordingly, "prior restraints were disfavored in
comparison to post-publication sanctions." RUDENSTINE, supra note 13, at 377-79 n.4.
'9 See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 745-46 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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tection of the First Amendment-to him, clearly the only proper
way to read the text of the Amendment-never commanded a
majority of the Court. Ironically, Justice Black's own commitment
to absolutism about freedom of expression drove him to a crabbed
view of how to define protected expression." In his last years,
Black seemed to maintain the purity of his position by narrowing
his classification of what counted as expression, thereby excluding
case after case from the robust constitutional protection he contin-
ued to embrace.
Furthermore, it is easy to read too much into the assertion
that "[f]or the first time since the very adoption of the Constitution
the U.S. government was seeking a prior restraint with respect to
the press."21 The point may be technically true-the averment par-
tially depends on how a prior restraint is defined-but its ad terro-
rem implication significantly overstates the relative historical sanc-
tity of the freedom of the press. The Civil War and World War I,
for example, proved to be hard times for publications outspokenly
critical of the war efforts, even for newspapers that gave offense in
mild and indirect ways. Throughout most of our nation's history,
government officials have been able to stop dissenting publications
effectively without the need for injunctions. 2 In Dennis v. United
20 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609-10 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (de-
clining to join decision holding statute prohibiting public desecration and disparagement
of American flag unconstitutional); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
515-26 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with decision upholding right of students
to wear black armbands); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (joining decision
upholding conviction for burning draft cards in violation of the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act of 1948); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (holding that
convictions of protesters for trespass did not abridge freedom of expression because "peo-
ple who want to propagandize protests or views [do not] have the constitutional right to do
so whenever and however and wherever they please").
21 RUDENSTINE, supra note 13, at 106; see also id. at 4.
22 The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, for example, spawned successful prosecutions
of editors and quite effective suppression of expression. See generally JAMES M. SMITH,
FREEDOM'S FETTERS (1956). For a description of Union military suppression of the press
through direct suspension of publication during the Civil War, along with exclusion of of-
fending papers from the mails and "the arbitrary arrest of offending editors," see J.G.
RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 477-510, 502 (rev. ed. 1964).
During World War I, there were well over 1000 federal prosecutions for disloyal utter-
ances, oral and written, and many state prosecutions as well. It is well known that subse-
quent punishment for expression was upheld by the Supreme Court in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and subsequent cases involving newspapers and handbills as
well as individual utterances. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES (1941). Perhaps less familiar was the denial of mail privileges to
newspapers and magazines. While this practice, arguably a very effective prior restraint,
was partially in Judge Learned Hand's famous district court opinion in Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
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States, for example, which upheld the convictions of leaders of the
Communist Party on the basis of the future harms that their words
threatened to produce, Chief Justice Vinson firmly (if not abso-
lutely) proclaimed that "[n]othing is more certain in modern soci-
ety than the principle that there are no absolutes, that a name, a
phrase, a standard has meaning only when associated with the con-
siderations which gave birth to the nomenclature." 23
The Government witnesses in the Pentagon Papers case who
sought to preserve the secrecy of the classification system em-
braced absolute values and a system functioning largely outside le-
gal norms and legal procedures. Hard-nosed pragmatic experts
within the national security establishment share considerable dis-
trust of the normal rule of law with Henry Schwarzschild. For
them, this translated into a kind of privileged legal shield. Indeed,
it was a privilege sufficiently broad and strong that they did not
feel entirely bound by normal legal rules. When Dennis James
Doolin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-
tional Security, testified in a closed session before Judge Gurfein,
for example, the increasingly frustrated judge gave the former CIA
senior analyst "one more chance" to specify potential harm that
publication of the Pentagon Papers would entail. Doolin told the
judge, "I could explain it, but I can't. 2 4
This "can't" announced by Doolin echoes the words of mar-
tyrs throughout history. But it is worth pondering what higher
authority Doolin thought to serve-and noteworthy that his re-
fusal to answer a judge's direct question in a closed court session
was treated as unremarkable.
C. The Gang That Couldn't File Suit Straight
1. The Imperatives of Categories
In retrospect, the fact that the Pentagon Papers case came to
be defined as a pure example of a prior restraint case made its le-
gal resolution appear relatively easy.25 It is revealing, however,
ond Circuit emphatically reversed, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917), and postal authorities refused
to process offending publications throughout the war.
23 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951). Aided by this apparent precursor of postmodernist
thought, Chief Justice Vinson determined quite firmly that "[s]peech is not an absolute,
above and beyond control by the legislature." Id.
24 RUDENSTINE, supra note 13, at 159.
25 Yet in the years before the Pentagon Papers case arose, leading experts pointed out
that there was no common understanding as to what constitutes a 'prior' restraint. Nor
was there much common ground as to why First Amendment doctrine so disfavored a
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that leading lawyers for the New York Times initially advised ve-
hemently against publication. They categorized the case differ-
ently and perceived that it would turn on the fact that the Penta-
gon Papers had been classified as Top Secret. Indeed, venerable
attorney Louis Loeb, who had been a legal adviser to the Times
since 1929 and served as its general counsel for many years, argued
vigorously that publication would expose the newspaper to prose-
cution under criminal espionage statutes and the executive order
establishing the classification system.26 It took careful legal work
and skillful advocacy by James Goodale, the young new general
counsel of the Times, to counter such advice and help persuade
Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger to publish. Goodale also
had to prevail over the forceful legal, political, and patriotic advice
of Loeb's senior partner, Herbert Brownell. As Attorney General
in the Eisenhower Administration, Brownell had drafted the Ex-
ecutive Order establishing the classification system that was still in
place and at issue in 1971.27
Rudenstine does a fine job explaining that the decision to
publish was anything but a sure thing at either the Times or at the
Washington Post. At the Post, in addition to immediate legal con-
cerns, Katharine Graham also had to worry about the impact that
boldness on behalf of freedom of the press might have on the
Post's pending broadcast license applications, to say nothing of the
potential effect on the price of more than 1,000,000 shares of stock
with which the Post had gone public merely two days earlier.
Rudenstine also astutely emphasizes "how crucial to any legal case
prior restraint even if it were properly so labeled. See, e.g., sources cited in RUDENSTINE,
supra note 13, at 377 n.4. For a more recent and particularly illuminating disagreement
about the appropriate weight to be assigned prior restraints, compare Vincent Blasi, To-
ward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981), with
John C. Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983). Tom Emerson, who
wrote the classic analysis of prior restraint, see Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955), was my teacher, and I was privileged
to be his teaching assistant for two years. I have a vivid memory of how excited this nor-
mally imperturbable man was about the Pentagon Papers case when I saw him in New
York on his way to the hearing in Judge Gurfein's courtroom.
26 See Espionage Act, ch. 30, Title I, §§ 1, 2, 40 Stat. 217, 218 (1917) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(e), 794(a) (1994)).
27 A very readable and nearly-contemporaneous account of the litigation by Sanford
Ungar reported that Goodale considered himself as much a newsman as a lawyer. Ungar
quoted Goodale: "There's always a way to get [a story] into print, everything that comes
to you." SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS 98 (1972) (alteration in origi-
nal). It helped Goodale that he had served in a strategic intelligence research group in the
Army Reserve and correctly guessed that there had to be something in the Pentagon Pa-
pers taken directly from the New York Times and stamped "Top Secret." See id.
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are the first set of moves. '28
In their first moves, made while working under enormous
time pressure, the lawyers for the Government all but conceded
the prior restraint label. Yet it was their effort to uphold the clas-
sification system that led them to make such a mishmash of decid-
ing what testimony their witnesses would be allowed to give, and
how secretive people should be in physically handling the allegedly
secret documents that constituted-the Pentagon Papers.29 Another
way the case might have been classified-indeed, the way it was
perceived initially by some of the Times' own lawyers-was that
most basically it implicated the integrity of the government classi-
fication system.
With the benefit of a temporal rearview mirror, one can see
that once the decision had been made to seek to enjoin publica-
tion, some of the ferocity that drove President Richard Nixon and
his inner circle to go after the Times and the Post involved per-
sonal vendettas-such as that of Henry Kissinger against his for-
mer student Daniel Ellsberg-and an almost paranoid general re-
lationship with the press?0 But Nixon also convinced himself that
he was obliged as President to protect the classification system and
classified documents, particularly when a newspaper such as the
Times. asserted that its journalistic obligations transcended na-
tional security concerns.31
It is hardly surprising, of course, that a person now generally
recognized to have been as deeply secretive and arrogant as Nixon
would talk explicitly about treason and would exhort his followers
to rally to the barricades and to pursue secret illegal stratagems in
the name of protecting the public's interest in secrecy. A basic
point that tripped up his lawyers was that the rules of the classifi-
cation system could be neither applied nor explained coherently.
Under the classification system rules in effect at the time, for ex-
ample, old articles from the New York Times and presidential ad-
dresses were correctly classified within the Pentagon Papers as
Top Secret, along with all the historical information about secret
diplomacy and military plans within the forty-seven volumes.
28 RUDENSTINE, supra note 13, at 109.
29 Sanford Ungar detailed a number of additional Justice Department errors and ques-
tionable tactical judgments, ranging from basic mistakes made in haste concerning venue
and miscitation of the Espionage Act, to a strikingly irregular pattern of reaction to vari-
ous newspapers around the country that published articles based on the secret materials.
See UNGAR, supra note 27, at 124, 151, 164, 190.
30 See RUDENSTINE, supra note 13, at 118-22.
31 See id. at 124..
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Moreover, no one could explain clearly how decisions either to
classify or to declassify were supposed to be made.
Judges Gurfein and Gesell were left to ponder a labyrinthine
bureaucratic system that seemed to be careening out of control.
As Justice Stewart forcefully put the point, "when everything is
classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one
to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be ma-
nipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. '32
The norms of the national intelligence community33 are hardly
coherent, nor do its members appear to constitute much of a
community. Moreover, in recent years there have been efforts to
reform significantly the classification and declassification mecha-
nisms of the federal government. For example, President Bill
Clinton's sweeping Executive Order No. 12,958 proclaims that, in
light of changed world conditions, there is now "greater opportu-
nity to emphasize our commitment to open Government."4 Re-
cently, a bipartisan Commission on Protecting and Reducing Gov-
ernment Secrecy also decried the "culture of secrecy" spawned by
the Cold War and proposed substantial reforms.35
That there is indeed a culture of secrecy is a key point, and
using law to change any culture is tricky at best. Within the cul-
ture of secrecy, there is a professional interest in finding things to
keep secret. There is also tremendous self-interest in maintaining
the discretion of insiders to determine whether a breach of secrecy
has occurred, and when it is appropriate to punish that breach.
Memoirs by former Presidents and other high officials that may
disclose top secret information are likely to go unpunished, while
whistle-blowers in various guises are likely to find themselves en-
tangled in threats of the loss of their security clearances, or worse.
In any culture, a crucial method by which insiders retain their
status is by determining who may remain within and who is to be
32 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971).
33 For example, in Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §
401 (1988), President Ronald Reagan proclaimed: "Maximum emphasis should be given to
fostering analytical competition among appropriate elements of the Intelligence Commu-
nity." This order reconstituted National Security Council procedures to enhance govern-
ment secrecy, and thereby facilitated the Iran-Contra imbroglio.
34 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995).
35 S. REP. No. 103-105-2 (1997). The Commission, convened by Senator Daniel Pat-
rick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), called for a return to a system affording government secrecy a
limited, albeit still significant, role. Following the Commission's recommendation, the
Government Secrecy Act of 1997, see H.R. 1546, was introduced on May 7, 1997 by Rep-
resentatives Larry Combest (R-Tex.) and Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.); its companion was in-
troduced in the Senate by Senator Moynihan and by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.).
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an outsider in varying degree.3 6 Whenever an exclusion is sanc-
tioned by the state, it carries particular weight. When a security
clearance has become necessary for a person's professional liveli-
hood, however, government officials and recipients of government
contracts have an unusually effective policing mechanism available
to them: even the threat of a loss of clearance brandished against
anyone who seems a risk can endanger an entire career.37
2. The Alleged H-Bomb Secret. The Limits of Legal Precedents
and Prior Restraints
From March through most of September, 1979, Federal Dis-
trict Judge Robert Warren barred The Progressive from publishing
an article entitled, "The H-bomb Secret: How We Got It-Why
We're Telling It."'38  For more than six months, the government
successfully imposed a prior restraint against the article written by
Howard Morland, a freelance journalist with no science back-
ground beyond a few college courses. Ultimately, because the in-
formation contained in the article began to appear in various ven-
ues and seemingly had been derived from a wide range of sources,
the case was mooted and the Government dropped its injunction
36 See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (George Simp-
son trans., 1966) (1930); KAI T. ERICKSON, THE WAYWARD PURITANS 5 (1966).
37 The phenomenon is widespread and effective, though it goes largely unreported. I
have seen it work myself. It takes considerable courage to defy the system. For example,
two scientists who were actively involved in the Progressive case, see discussion infra Part
I.C.2, recently ran afoul of the classification system. Alexander DeVolpi, a nonprolifera-
tion specialist at Argonne National Laboratory, was temporarily stripped of his top level
security clearance after he published articles that purportedly revealed classified informa-
tion. Similarly, Hugh DeWitt, an astrophysicist at Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory, was slapped with a security infraction after uttering classified words to a Department
of Energy Commission charged with reforming classification policies. While their clear-
ances have been restored, both men speculated that the DOE imposed the sanctions in
order to harass and to intimidate them. See Steve Usdin, Argonne Scientist's Security
Clearance Restored, NEW TECH. WK., Sept. 23, 1996, at 1; Al Kamen, The Campaign Road
More Traveled, WASH. POST, June 10, 1996, at A17; Steve Usdin, Critical Scientist Loses
Clearance, Charges DOE with Retaliation, NEW TECH. WK., Apr. 22, 1996, at 1.
38 See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). The Su-
preme Court denied leave to file a petition for mandamus, though Justice White wrote a
dissent, joined by Justice Brennan. I should disclose that I spent most of the summer of
1979 working in the national office of the ACLU on various aspects of the Progressive
case. This is hardly the place to give my perspectives on that fascinating time, and there
are other significant firsthand accounts available. See, e.g., ALEXANDER DEVOLPI ET AL.,
BORN SECRET: THE H-BOMB, THE PROGRESSIVE CASE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY
(1981); HOWARD MORLAND, THE SECRET THAT EXPLODED (1981); Erwin Knoll, The
H-Bomb and the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 705 (1994). See also
ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
ACTION 39-54 (1990).
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suit before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit could hand down its decision on appeal.
Of course, the Supreme Court's decision allowing publication
in the Pentagon Papers case only eight years earlier was the lead-
ing precedent. But those involved in the Progressive case also had
to grapple with massive fears triggered by allegations that Mor-
land's article might actually reveal aspects of the H-bomb secret.
The very idea of helping other nations build the H-bomb made it
seem to many that government secrecy ought to take precedence
over freedom of the press precedents. As a legal matter, the Pro-
gressive case also arguably was properly set apart because it di-
rectly implicated the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.19 In particular,
the Government claimed that Morland's article was secret under
an interpretation of the Act that claimed that many ideas pertain-
ing to nuclear matters became government secrets immediately
upon coming into existence.40
To be sure, the very notion that any information can be "born
classified" is surrounded by, and perhaps bogged down in, episte-
mological quicksand. Under this rule, for example, the instanta-
neous classification of nascent knowledge meant that the under-
linings in Howard Morland's dog-eared college physics textbook
were deemed Top Secret, and Edward Teller's article on the hy-
drogen bomb in the popular Encyclopedia Americana also pur-
portedly contained classified information. Day after day, catch-22
situations arose in which lawyers working on the case who had
been given security clearance could not tell other lawyers working
with them who lacked the requisite clearance that what the law-
yers or their clients were saying was classified and/or violated the
injunction. Indeed, during the course of the litigation, four coura-
geous physicists at the Argonne National Laboratory, under con-
tract with the Department of Energy, wrote a letter to Senator
John Glenn (D-Ohio), then the Chairperson of the Senate Sub-
committee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services,
asserting that affidavits released by the Government in support of
its efforts to prevent disclosure actually had disclosed precisely
39 Atomic Energy Act, ch. 724, §§ 1-21, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1994)).
40 Under § 2162, information pertaining to nuclear energy and nuclear weapons be-
comes Restricted Data without any action by any government agency. It is thus "born
classified." For a clear treatment of this and related issues in the context of the Progres-
sive case, see Mary M. Cheh, The Progressive Case and the Atomic Energy Act: Waking to
the Dangers of Government Information Controls, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 163 (1980).
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what the Government was struggling to keep secret.4'
There is an Orwellian quality to the concept that, without
proper clearance, one may not have access to one's own ideas or
work product. Moreover, these ideas are classified in the very act
of becoming, without any procedures whatsoever. The Alice-in-
Wonderland aspects of the power of naming inherent in the "born
classified" doctrine helped to make the Progressive case a minor
cause clebre, as did the appearance of the alleged secret in diverse
publications all around the country, without any link to the parties
involved in the case itself.
If the case imparts a single important lesson, it is that freedom
of expression guarantees are always vulnerable: even after the fa-
mous Pentagon Papers victory for the press, the Carter Admini-
stration easily invoked the arcana of the classification system to
frighten a federal judge into imposing a prior restraint for over half
a year to cloak a secret that was dubious at best.
Yet surely it is easy to empathize with District Judge Warren's
fear of nuclear proliferation-though perhaps not with his appar-
ent application of an updated version of the World War I-era "bad
tendency" test as the legal standard in the case. As in the Penta-
gon Papers case, sophisticated insiders in the Progressive litigation
sought to convince a judge with no background in an area rife with
esoteric knowledge that special knowledge was required to com-
prehend the extent to which what was about to be disclosed would
irreparably injure the national interest. Early in the case, Judge
Warren sounded like an American Everyman when he proclaimed,
"I'd like.., to think a long hard time before I gave the hydrogen
bomb to Idi Amin. '' 41 Much of the press initially reacted similarly.
Even the Washington Post editorialized that this was "John
Mitchell's dream case-the one the Nixon administration was
never lucky enough to get: a real First Amendment loser. '43
41 The letter, dated April 25, 1979, was signed by the four authors of Born Secret. See
DEVOLPI ET AL., supra note 38. It was initially ignored and then turned over to the De-
partment of Energy, which promptly classified the letter. The letter is included as Appen-
dix B to the informative recounting of the case in their book.
42 Id. at 61 (quoting comment made during the initial hearing before Judge Warren
granted a temporary restraining order). Later, in granting and then sustaining a prelimi-
nary injunction, Judge Warren emphasized'that the Progressive case differed from the
Pentagon Papers case in two vital respects: 1) there was a statute, the Atomic Energy Act,
that seemed to him to cover the situation; and 2) the threatened harm was so grave that
the publication was akin to disclosing the location of troop ships or some of the other very
narrow exceptions to the heavy presumption against prior restraints. Judge Warren sum-
marized his point by noting, "You can't speak freely when you're dead." Id.
43 John Mitchell's Dream Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1979, at C6. To be sure, the
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Though insiders disagreed, and some brave experts were willing to
support publication, those most directly associated with the na-
tional security establishment sought to scare Judge Warren away
from permitting publication.
I have discussed the Progressive case briefly in part to counter
the widespread urge to be sanguine about freedom of the press af-
ter New York Times Co. v. United States." More awareness of the
Progressive case may reduce the tendency to attribute suppression
of freedom of expression to wartime pressures or to the likes of
President Nixon and his cronies. The nation was at peace when
the liberal Carter Administration sought and won an injunction
that restrained Morland's article. The strange entanglements of
the Progressive litigation illustrate the inherent difficulties lawyers
and judges encounter when they confront the unfamiliar. This is
especially so when the unknown is defined and defended by an in-
sistently esoteric interpretive community.45 In other words, those
whose specialized inside knowledge is law have great difficulty
penetrating and evaluating the special knowledge that creates the
community of national security insiders.
Declaring that enormous stakes were at issue, the national se-
curity experts who defined the case found it relatively easy to con-
vince the judiciary that the heady mix of classified nuclear infor-
mation made the Progressive case crucially different from the
willingness of various newspapers around the country to publish information from other
sources that was said to contain the same secret as the Morland article led directly to the
unraveling of the Government's case. Moreover, Dimitri Rotow, a college dropout who
volunteered to work for the ACLU, discovered a document, UCRL-4725, on the open
public shelves in the library at Los Alamos. This document, which apparently was mistak-
enly declassified, had been available to the public for more than a year. Another, appar-
ently related document, UCRL-5280, also contained the results of weapons calculations
and tests and similarly had been mistakenly declassified and available to the public for
over a year on the open shelves. The Department of Energy stipulated that the essence of
the H-bomb secret in the Morland article would be apparent to any "competent scientist"
who read UCRL-5280. The physicists who wrote Born Secret use this stipulation and
similar examples to bolster their ironic but substantial claim that, "[i]n pursuing the Pro-
gressive case, the government confirmed the basic ideas in Howard Morland's article, and
incidentally released further nondeducible information about a component of the Ameri-
can nuclear arsenal-with indeterminate harm to national security." DEVOLPI ET AL.,
supra note 38, at 179. With careful marshaling of the evidence, these scientists argued that
the Morland article should simply have been ignored.
44 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
45 The importance of interpretive communities has recently been a big topic in acade-
mia. The concept may have had its first important articulation over a century ago, how-
ever, in the writing of the eccentric American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. See R.
JACKSON WILSON, IN QUEST OF COMMUNITY: SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1860-1920, at 48 (1968).
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classified historical and diplomatic information at stake in the Pen-
tagon Papers litigation.46  They were accustomed to a system
whose rules allowed them to classify as Top Secret whatever they
chose without regular procedures or any external review. The
Born Classified rationale could apply from the moment of the
germination of these ideas and could even be applied retroactively.
In fact, the Progressive litigation exemplified this point. The deci-
sion by Government officials to label a publication as a national
security risk moved the dispute outside the usual legal rules and
beyond the ken of regular judicial processes.
Because "[t]he function of the censor is to censor, '47 the judi-
cial system is particularly strained when judges are thrust into re-
viewing the decisions of insiders about the gravity and directness
of threatened harm, its irreparable quality, and its relative imme-
diacy. Modern information technology may make it impossible to
sustain a prior restraint today. Moreover, the history of prior re-
straints seems rife with administrative overreaction. Yet it is im-
portant to notice that the Times, the Post, and even The Progres-
sive were not deterred by their obvious exposure to potential
criminal sanctions, but that all these publications scrupulously
sought to obey judicial injunctions. This strongly suggests that ju-
dicially-imposed prior restraints do indeed make a substantial
practical difference.48
46 In fact, the Government went beyond its reliance on the far-reaching born classified
doctrine. On appeal, Government attorneys argued that "technical information" con-
cerning-but apparently not limited to-nuclear matters is not covered by the First
Amendment at all. Like obscenity, therefore, such unprotected speech can be limited
without undergoing even a minimal balancing test. See Brief for Appellee, United States
v. Progressive, Inc., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). For a vigorous critique of the entire ra-
tionale of national security, including, but hardly restricted to, such doctrinal points, see
Erwin Knoll, National Security: The Ultimate Threat to the First Amendment, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 161 (1981). In Knoll's essay, which was part of a 50-year retrospective on the Near
decision, the late editor of The Progressive did a characteristically feisty job of explaining
some of the ironic, if not absurdist, practical consequences for lawyers and clients of liti-
gating while under an injunction severely restricting their ability to communicate with
each other, with the outside world, and even with the judge. In an article written shortly
before his death in 1994, Knoll announced his regret that he had not defied the Court's
injunction. See Knoll, supra note 38, at 713. On the other hand, in The Secret That Ex-
ploded, supra note 38, Howard Morland catalogued his differences with Knoll and argued
that Knoll had decided that a confrontation with the Government was preferable to im-
mediate publication. Scot Powe went even further when he observed that "the injunction
consummated a successful courtship initiated by the delivery of a copy of Morland's article
and diagrams to the Department of Energy ("DOE"), builder of the nation's nuclear arse-
nal." L.A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 55, 56 (1990).
47 Emerson, supra note 25, at 659.
48 For a snappy elaboration of related themes, see Powe, supra note 46, at 63-66. It is
quite remarkable, in fact, how deferential to the legal system American radicals often
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In contrast to those who find comfort and even delight in
paradox, the intelligence community repeatedly stressed the need
for absolute secrecy and for exclusive expertise. The absolutism of
the classification scheme and the best-and-brightest role these ex-
perts played became the source of their deep sense of being unfet-
tered by ordinary legal procedures. Indeed, the very concept of
born classified insisted on the ability of those in the know to sepa-
rate a new idea and its material manifestation from its human
originator. A strange irony linking the Pentagon Papers and the
Progressive cases was that the insiders, by pinpointing what pur-
portedly were vital national secrets, actually flagged the impor-
tance of what they sought to squelch for outsiders who otherwise
might have paid little or no attention.
If the fault lines between legal and extralegal norms are broad
and deep, only rarely are they so clearly revealed. When, for ex-
ample, Dennis Doolin told Judge Gurfein in closed session, "I
could explain it, but I can't,''9 Doolin's answer was directly an-
chored in a competing community norm that easily seemed to
outweigh normal-and perhaps even exceptional-legal processes.
This kind of challenge to the law's supremacy from outside the le-
gal order may not have emerged completely triumphant from the
Pentagon Papers litigation. Yet when the contest turned from
revelations of past history to purportedly very serious future
threats, it became virtually impossible to defend in court against a
top secret national security claim.
Insiders within the convoluted security classification system
are understandably inclined to invoke their special knowledge of
national security matters. The mind-twisting ramifications of the
born classified doctrine suggest how bizarrely sweeping (and at-
tractive) the power to impose on others via one's own expertise
can be. It is hardly surprising that such special knowledge cannot
be readily contained or controlled by judicial generalists in the
course of traditional judicial procedures. In this sense, at least, the
excessive secrecy within the Progressive case is likely to be a more
prescient precedent than the Pentagon Papers.
prove to be. Perhaps the most telling historical example can be found in the decision by
one of the anarchists accused in the Haymarket Bombing in Chicago in 1886 to turn him-
self in though he was safely in hiding. There were numerous procedural irregularities in
the ensuing trial of Spies, but he was hanged despite great doubts about his actual guilt.
See generally PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY (1986).
49 See supra text accompanying note 24.
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II. A PROPHETIC CHALLENGE
Henry Schwarzschild was not much concerned with his own
place in history, though he was neither a shrinking violet nor
someone who lacked a healthy ego. Henry's scathing skepticism
often focused on how sobering history actually turns out to be. On
the other hand, he viewed historical accuracy as a necessary plat-
form from which to launch the search for justice.
In fewer than nine pages, Milner Ball provides a beautifully
written, remarkably accurate portrait of Henry and his moral land-
scape. 0 In Henry's world, one had to challenge unjust laws, either
as written or applied, and to defy those who insisted on absolute
obedience. "Whatever the cost," Henry explained, "I would not
live in a period of major moral, social events and be a bystander..
. I took on the role of witness."5 The Germans of his youth had
been bystanders. Henry refused to be that kind of German.
Though he participated directly in many groups and move-
ments, Henry could not escape his own intuitive reservations
about passionate social aggregations. He traced his suspicions to
his first-grade experience in a suburb of Berlin when his teacher
came to school in a Brown Shirt uniform. Yet Henry loved to ad-
dress groups and to challenge them to act differently-and more
radically-to hasten a more just world.
Henry once wrote that being classified as Jewish did not con-
fer "standing or claim to preferment or even to protection (from
the Holocaust, or by a nation-state, or whatever else). 12 Rather,
being Jewish meant particular responsibility to bear witness ac-
tively, to seek justice even for unpleasant people who have done
horrible things. Jews were not born free, but obligated. Though
not religious in any traditional sense, Henry added, "We do not
serve the master in expectation of a reward, but because it says
thou shalt.""
Only Henry Schwarzschild's death in June 1996 could disen-
gage this lifelong activist from launching his direct challenges to
some of the most pressing denials of justice of our times. Appar-
ently, there are no pictures of Henry's experience in Mississippi
50 See MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW 7-16 (1993).
51 Id. at 9-10. Marie Failinger made the point that "what intrigues us about Atticus
Finch [in To Kill a Mockingbird] is precisely what intrigues us about Henry Schwarzschild
in Milner Ball's book." Marie Failinger, Gentleman as Hero: Atticus Finch and the Lonely
Path, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 303,304 (1994).
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jails as a Freedom Rider in 1961, but he can be seen standing
alongside Martin Luther King, Jr. in photographs throughout the
early 1960s. Henry, who proudly identified himself as "a specialist
in losing causes,"5 then worked as Coordinator of the Lawyers
Constitutional Defense Committee, a messy but valiant effort by
volunteer lawyers to support the Freedom Summer movement and
its consequences in the mid-1960s. He went on to antiwar activism
and the campaign for amnesty for Vietnam War resisters in the
early 1970s. For the last fifteen years of his life, Henry played a
leading role in the national campaign against the death penalty,
first as Director of the ACLU's Capital Punishment Project and
then as head of the New York office of the National Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty. He also served on the National Advi-
sory Committee of the American-Arab Antidiscrimination Com-
mittee and the boards of various civil liberties organizations.
Tellingly, "he could be counted on to turn up anytime the Move-
ment needed help.""
Henry also could be counted on to challenge cant wherever he
saw it, no matter who or what its source. He questioned with
acerbic wit and a love for verbal combat. To Henry, freedom of
expression was a universal goal. He scolded a friend who had been
thinking about the possible acceptability of limited restrictions on
hate speech. Henry explained, "I am a devout believer in civility,
even in manners, except of course where manners interfere with
pressing moral requirements. 5 6
For all his interest in legal values and his tenacious defense of
constitutional principles, Henry Schwarzschild was a nonlawyer
who liked to explain to lawyers and law students that he felt
54 Cf Letter from Rade Dj. Mikijelj to Henry Schwarzschild (July 10, 1991) (quoting
Henry's statement back to him in response to Henry's inquiries about the political condi-
tions in Yugoslovia) (on file with author).
55 FRED POWLEDGE, FREE AT LAST? 645 (1991), quoted in Eric Pace, Henry Schwar-
zschild, 70, Opponent of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1996, at B8.
56 Letter from Henry Schwarzschild to Milner Ball (May 30, 1991) (on file with
author). Henry's brother, Steven Schwarzschild, reported, "As my brother and I always
put it to each other: we know that the world is about to perish, but one must dress for din-
ner anyway." THE PURSUIT OF THE IDEAL: JEWISH WRITINGS OF STEVEN
SCHWARZSCHILD 255 (Menachem Kellner ed., 1990). Steven also explained that "[tihe
only cases where I feel I must initiate speech and action are cases of immediate human,
moral, and social, need-not, again, really in the expectation that I can improve things but
simply because this is what it means to me to be 'a mensch."' Id.
Henry was fascinated by the moral implications of the actions of John Brown, for
example. Henry did not go as far as did Thoreau in defending John Brown's ill-fated 1859
attack on slavery at Harpers Ferry, but neither did he simply condemn the attack because
of the resort to deadly force by Brown and his followers.
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obliged to act in part because of his profound doubts about law.
Indeed, he could not seem to resist the call to challenge and to ex-
plain. 7 To Henry, "No important social matter is a legal issue, in-
cluding important questions about law. 5 8 Thus one is obligated to
work against the death penalty and would be so whether or not
there ever had been an Eighth Amendment.
Unlike many who oppose the death penalty, Henry did not try
to camouflage the fact that the people for whose cause he fought
were generally bad people who had done horrible things to others.
The obligation to oppose the death penalty persistently and by vir-
tually any means arises, said Henry, because the state sanction-
including judicial action-makes capital punishment "far more
ominous than the depressing but merely tragic acts of murder that
the human race has experienced since Cain." 9  Sardonically,
Henry believed it appropriate that Oklahoma officials rushed a
death row inmate to the hospital when he attempted suicide the
evening of his scheduled execution. The inmate had his stomach
pumped and was resuscitated-so that he could be executed only
two hours later than planned. "[Q]uite right," Henry asserted,
"the issue is not dying but getting executed." 6
At a 1990 Jerusalem conference about "Justice in Punish-
ment," Henry Schwarzschild felt obliged to point out the rough
numerical equivalency between the number of people executed by
means of what he called "American state homicide" after the Su-
preme Court allowed the death penalty to be reinstated in 1976,
and the number of Palestinians killed during the intifada under
what he termed "a[n Israeli] governmental policy that explicitly
sanctions brutality and sanctions these killings-summarily, crassly
57 For almost a decade, for example, he traveled each winter to the woods of New
Hampshire (which he loathed) in order to tell public interest lawyers and law students at
the Robert Cover Memorial Public Interest Conference about how one could keep fight-
ing for losing causes-even when the losses meant someone on your side died. In his last
years, Henry worked fitfully on a collective biography of four Africans who were intellec-
tually or artistically significant in 18th century Europe. Henry studied documents about
these little-known men in libraries throughout Europe and the United States, but his own
impossibly high intellectual standards along with the courage of the convictions that kept
calling him somewhere to engage against imminent injustices-followed by his health cri-
ses-kept Henry from getting far into what could have been a pathbreaking study.
58 BALL, supra note 50, at 12.
59 Henry Schwarzschild, Reflections on Capital Punishment, 25 ISRAEL L. REV. 505,
510 (1991).
60 E-mail from Henry Schwarzschild to Aviam Soifer (Aug. 11, 1995) (commenting on
execution of Robert Brecheen) (on file with author); see also Serge F. Kovaleski, Inmate
Survives Overdose, Is Sent Back for Execution, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1995, at A3.
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in terrorem.' '61 Henry went on to assert that any state that seeks to
solve social problems by killing human beings is, to that extent,
profoundly uncivilized. State executions are worse than murder,
Henry argued, because they "desacralize human life," and because
there is no acceptable answer to the question, "Why do we kill
people who kill people in order to teach that killing people is
wrong?"62 Needless to say, not all Henry's hosts greeted his state-
ment with glee. But Henry believed he had to bear witness, to be
recorded "in horror and opposition also to these killings. '63
Characteristically, Henry pushed ahead in an effort to root his
moral point in the practical world. Unlike the intelligence classifi-
cation insiders, he had no wish to create, nor any compulsion to
defend, architectonic constructs. Rather, Henry had an intense
long-term lover's quarrel with law.
He even went so far as to suggest that an American citizen
called for jury duty is morally bound to commit perjury when
asked about her or his scruples about the death penalty. If one lies
and is seated on the jury, Henry continued, the unanimity re-
quirement makes it possible for that person single-handedly to
prevent the death penalty. Then, asked this sardonic European in-
tellectual, his brown eyes flashing under arched, bushy black eye-
brows, "Is it morally tolerable to have the defendant, on his way to
the electric chair, turn to you to say: You could have saved my life,
and you refused, but at least you did not perjure yourself in the
voir dire before trial?"64 Henry answered his own challenge by
pointing out that abolition of the death penalty would eliminate
such dilemmas while it would also "significantly ennoble the pol-
ity." 65
Like Dennis Doolin, who said he couldn't answer Judge Gur-
fein's direct question even in a closed courtroom, and like a num-
61 Schwarzschild, supra note 59, at 506.
62 Id. at 510.
63 Id. at 506.
64 Id. at 511. I was not with Henry at this conference, though I was on sabbatical in
Israel and saw him there. Henry had entered Israel by crossing the Allenby Bridge after
flying into Amman, because he wanted to see some of his colleagues working on peace
and human rights on the Arab side of the Jordan. I heard Henry challenge and sometimes
outrage numerous groups of law students and lawyers with this and similar moral quanda-
ries, so I think I have a good sense of how enlivened Henry was and how he looked at such
a moment.
65 Id. Actually, Henry expressed some doubt about how to answer his own question.
Because he firmly believed that death is "morally radically different" from any other
criminal sanction, however, Henry called for an extra measure of intellectual searching in
response to his stark hypothetical, even as he proclaimed with certainty that "we must free
ourselves of states that kill." Id.
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ber of insiders who tried many techniques to shield the bafflingly
complex classification system from any outside inquiry in the
course of the Progressive case, Henry underscored the issue of
when and why obedience to some other, perhaps higher, claims
could justify ignoring-perhaps even defying-the norms of the
legal system. Such occasions may be rare, but attention must be
paid. One would have to be blind to past evils and indifferent to
present injustices to believe that the rule of law was or should be
an end in itself. Life is too tragic and human evil too real for that
kind of leap of faith.
It might seem paradoxical that Henry was painfully aware of
how the absence of a predictable and minimally fair legal regime is
itself greatly to be feared. In pursuit of universal justice, Henry
knew how to transform unrelenting skepticism into creative ten-
sion. Paradox begot commitment. Henry explained his work as
coordinator of efforts by volunteer Northern lawyers to support
civil rights activists in the South in the mid-1960s, for example, as
necessary because the alternative was leaving people unrepre-
sented, locked up in little county jails and subject to being clob-
bered or killed. 6 It was important that the LCDC lawyers helped
keep activists out of jail, largely by removing their cases to federal
court. But it was later crucial that Northern whites and Jews who
helped the civil rights movement not fall prey to the sin of pride.
Instead, Henry reminded, "We, and the country, learned in awe at
the feet of black leaders and simple black people what a commit-
ment to freedom and justice really means."6 7
Like other committed seekers, Henry pursued the universal
through the particular. He fiercely favored the free exchange of
ideas, yet he knew that ideas could not truly be free. As Justice
Holmes put it, "The past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the
limits of our imagination: we cannot get away from it."68 And
Henry was quite old-fashioned in his close attention to individual
quirks and to the mixed motivations and strivings of friends as well
66 See Thomas M. Hilbink, Filling the Void: The Lawyers Constitutional Defense
Committee and the 1964 Freedom Summer 96 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). Henry's language in this important oral history interview was considerably saltier
than this paraphrase. He also made the important point that "[flortunately ... nobody
thought in those days of malpractice insurance. That would have killed it right there." Id.
at 38.
67 Henry Schwarzschild, Al Chet: For the Sin of Pride, 3 SH'MA, Oct. 5, 1973, at 137,
138.
68 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139
(1952).
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as foes.
For all his seemingly Old World traits, there was an anoma-
lous, emphatically American strand in what propelled Henry into
the uphill battles he loved to fight. Freedom, for example, did not
mean rejecting what one was born with or sloughing off the classi-
fication barnacles accumulated throughout life. Yet Henry de-
lighted in the raucous freedoms in which many Americans indulge.
Like Henry David Thoreau, with whom he shared an acquired
name but most definitely not an abiding love of the outdoors,
Henry Schwarzschild undertook a knowledgeable quest for
self-emancipation. Yet for both men, self-emancipation could not
be achieved at the expense of ignoring the freedom of others.69
Henry Schwarzschild was an extraordinary man of our times,
but he was also somewhat akin to the ancient prophets, because he
was "preoccupied with man, with the concrete actualities of history
rather than with the timeless issues of thought."70 The great Rabbi
Abraham Heschel, later to join the civil rights struggle himself,
celebrated the Hebrew prophets for their active commitment to in-
terference, to an "outgoing, transitive, inclusive" sense of justice
that probed beneath forms and repeatedly denied ultimate laws
and eternal ideas.71
Henry, too, seemed to know more about "the secret obscenity
of sheer unfairness, about the unnoticed malignancy of established
patterns of indifference, than men whose knowledge depends
solely on intelligence and learning. 7  As Shalom Spiegel put it,
"Unlike the philosopher, the prophet can never rest at ease until
the interval between contemplation and action is breached. ' 73 And
Henry had a very good ear for "the silent sigh. 74Abraham Heschel and Henry Schwarzschild actually knew
each other. In 1966, Heschel sought advice about whether he
should join the board of a new Poverty Rights Action Center,
founded by George Wiley. Henry weighed the issues, mentioned
some of the internecine battles and the fundraising challenges in-
69 See RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 316. In his "Slavery in Massachusetts" speech on
July 4, 1854, Thoreau proclaimed: "I wish my countrymen to consider, that whatever the
human law may be, neither an individual nor a nation can ever commit the least act of in-
justice against the obscurest individual, without having to pay the penalty for it." Id. at
315.
70 ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL, THE PROPHETS 5 (rev. ed. Harper & Row 1969) (1936).
Heschel first published the book in Crakow and Berlin.
71 Id. at 205, 210.
72 Id. at 9.
73 Spiegel, supra note 1, at 60.
74 HESCHEL, supra note 70, at 9.
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volved, and noted that the group was very poor and that-in
seeking societal change such as a guaranteed annual income-they
had taken on a very tough task. Despite doubts about whether the
group could survive, Henry advised Heschel to join the board.
Heschel wrote back to thank Henry and to say he was following
his advice 5.7  Henry had written to Heschel, "George Wiley is a
very able and good man .... [H]e is a man willing to take chan-
ces. '76 So was Henry.
The questions Henry Schwarzschild insistently asked and the
activist life he so persistently led underscore how "in and through
the personal rediscovery of the great, we find that we need not be
the passive victims of what we deterministically call 'circum-
stances' . . . [B]y linking ourselves ... with the great we can be-
come freer-freer to be ourselves, to be what we most want and
value. ' 77 I often disagreed with Henry, and I loved to argue with
him. Yet Henry Schwarzschild greatly helped me and countless
others in the struggle to be free.
75 See Letter from Abraham Heschel to Henry Schwarzschild (Nov. 14, 1966) (on file
with author).
76 Letter from Henry Schwarzschild to Abraham Heschel (Nov. 7, 1966) (on file with
author).
77 W.J. Bate, The Burden of the Past and the English Poet (1971), quoted in RICHARD-
SON, supra note 2, frontispiece.
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